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Based on fifteen years of original research Daron Acemoglu and James
Robinson marshall a broad range of historical evidence from the Roman Empire, the
Mayan city-states, medieval Venice, the Soviet Union, Latin America, England,
Europe, the United States, and Africa to build a new theory of political economy,
ultimately examining why some nations are poor and others rich. Janet Hunter takes
issue with the absence of nuancing in the book, but is nevertheless impressed by its
striking historical narratives which will do much to captivate readers and stimulate debate.
Why Nations Fail: the Origins of  Power, Prosperity, and
Poverty. Daron Acemoglu & James A Robinson. Crown
Business. March 2012.
The scholarly work of  Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson is
already widely known among economic historians, economists and
polit ical scient ists. In Why Nations Fail Acemoglu and Robinson
seek to convey to a much broader audience the results of  many
years’ path-breaking research on the historical role of  inst itut ions –
def ined as “the rules inf luencing how the economy works, and the
incent ives that mot ivate people” – and their impact (p .73). The
result  is a highly readable work of  enormous geographical and
chronological range that addresses one of  the most pressing
issues of  the contemporary world. With much of  its content
consist ing of  good, old-fashioned historical narrat ive – something I
did not quite expect – this book will without doubt appeal to a broad readership.
The basic case that the authors seek to make in the book is a simple one, namely that nat ions
with extract ive polit ical and economic inst itut ions are likely to be poor, whereas those with
inclusive inst itut ions are likely to be rich. Polit ics is paramount: the existence of  centralised and
pluralist ic polit ical inst itut ions is the key to the sustained existence of  inclusive economic
inst itut ions. While a degree of  economic growth may be possible under extract ive inst itut ions, such
growth is not sustainable, as shown by the cases of , for example, the later Roman Empire or the
Soviet  Union. Once a nat ion has started to move towards inclusive inst itut ions a posit ive feedback
loop may help to keep them in place, but extract ive inst itut ions are also sustained by path
dependence, with those in power fearful of  the “creat ive destruct ion” generated by change,
producing a vicious circle. The argument put forward is not, however, one of  inst itut ional
determinism. Small inst itut ional dif ferences, and what the authors refer to as “inst itut ional drif t ”
over t ime can interact  with “crit ical junctures” and historical cont ingency to produce a change in
path. By analysing such inst itut ional evolut ion in its historical set t ing, Acemoglu and Robinson
argue that we can better understand why some countries are rich and others poor, how that
pattern may have changed over t ime, and even how the problem of global inequality might be
addressed in the future.
Striking historical examples are used to demonstrate the key importance of  inst itut ions, and to
reject  the explanatory power of  geography and culture. The two Koreas, united unt il the late
1940s, and sharing a common geography and culture, have since diverged dramat ically in
inst itut ional and wealth terms. Exploitat ive Spanish imperialists in search of  plunder put Lat in
America on a path of  extract ive and unproduct ive inst itut ions, while the same inst itut ions failed to
work in North America, allowing the appearance of  democracy and inst itut ions more conducive to
growth. Case proved? Well, up to a point . It  is certainly hard to dispute the claim that “inst itut ions
matter”, and the authors themselves have played a major role in demonstrat ing the signif icance of
colonial inst itut ions, for example, in shaping the economic development of  colonised countries,
and in the primacy of  polit ical inst itut ions in shaping economic ones. Few academic readers will
take issue with the basic message of  this important book. What many readers will be less
comfortable with, perhaps, is the oversimplif icat ion inevitably associated with almost any
monocausal explanat ion, and the wholesale reject ion of  other compet ing explanat ions of
historical development. To be fair, the authors in the conclusion acknowledge the limitat ions of
their approach, but their exaggerated depict ion of  the determinism associated with geographical
or cultural explanat ions, for example, prevents them from acknowledging the subt le historical
interplay between geographical factors, culture (however that might be def ined) and inst itut ions,
whether extract ive or inclusive. For example, the authors’ own account shows that a major reason
why the extract ive inst itut ions of  the Spanish could not be copied in North America was the very
absence of  riches (gold and silver) that  could be plundered. Acemoglu and Robinson have also in
the past been crit icised for “compressing” history, and their theory raises major quest ions about
what t ime periods matter in inst itut ional terms. The extract ive Mayan Empire, for example,
cont inued to generate wealth over more than six centuries.
Acemoglu and Robinson are careful to emphasize the importance of  historical cont ingency in their
interpretat ion; inst itut ional dynamics respond to crit ical junctures and new opportunit ies. In that
context  one of  the things that comes out of  their account is the recurrent importance of  chance
and luck, and also the importance of  individual actors, somewhat reminiscent of  the ‘great men’
interpretat ions of  history so popular in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Botswana, for example,
was profoundly fortunate to have as its leader Seretse Khama, who sustained the move towards
more inclusive inst itut ions, unlike Robert  Mugabe in Zimbabwe or Mobutu in the Congo. Their
historical account is thus populated with a rich cast of  heroes and villains of  all shades. Not
surprisingly for those familiar with their work, imperialism is one of  the main culprits, but  far f rom
the only one. These, and other somewhat black and white depict ions, will do much to sell Why
Nations Fail, but  they will also contribute to the book’s arousing strong views, part icularly in its
absence of  nuancing. There is therefore much to commend about this book, and much to take
issue with, but even its crit ics will concede that it  is based on serious scholarship, will do much to
st imulate debate, and is a very good read.
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